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Abstract
Transparency has been a central issue in the debate regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),
especially on the side of the European Union (EU). The lack of transparency in the negotiating process has been one of
the main criticisms of civil society organizations (CSOs). The European Commission (EC) has tried to gain support for the
negotiations through various ‘transparency initiatives’. Nonetheless, criticism by CSOs with regard to TTIP in general and
the lack of transparency in specific remained prevalent. In this article, we explain this gap between various transparency
initiatives implemented by the EC in TTIP and the expectations on the side of European CSOs. We perform a content anal-
ysis of position papers on transparency produced by CSOs, mainly in response to a European Ombudsman consultation,
complemented by a number of official documents and targeted interviews. We find that the gap between the TTIP trans-
parency initiatives and the expectations of CSOs can be explained by different views on what constitutes legitimate trade
governance, and the role of transparency, participation, and accountability herein.
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1. Introduction
The negotiations between the European Union (EU) and
the United States (US) on the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) have led to an unprece-
dented public debate. In particular, the lack of trans-
parency was one of the main criticisms of civil society or-
ganizations (CSOs)1 with respect to these negotiations,
particularly within the EU. Even though ‘transparency’
can have various meanings in different contexts (see
Heald, 2006), it is here generally understood as public
access to information about an organization’s activities
and policies (Tallberg, 2014). In response to this appar-
ent lack of transparency, the European Commission (EC)
introduced several measures to address these concerns.
Nonetheless, CSOs remained unsatisfied and continued
to criticize the opaqueness of the negotiations. This ar-
ticle aims to explain why transparency demands in the
TTIP prevail after several transparency initiatives have
been implemented.
Shortly after the launch of the TTIP negotiations in
2013, more than 80 organizations from the EU and the
US wrote a letter to the then Presidents Barack Obama,
José Manuel Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy express-
ing their ‘opposition to the use of behind-closed-door
trade negotiations to change and lower public interest
measures for the sake of commercial interest’ (Public Citi-
zen, 2013). Togetherwith the substantial issues of regula-
1 With CSOs, we refer to ‘non-market and nonstate organizations in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain’
(United Nations Development Programme, 2013).
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tory cooperation and investment protection, the alleged
lack of transparency of the negotiations was central in
the majority of CSOs’ campaigns. In response to these
criticisms, increasing transparency has been the main re-
sponse of the EC to (re)gain support for the negotiations.
In themission letter to his future Commissioner for Trade
Cecilia Malmström, the current President of the EC Jean-
Claude Juncker wrote ‘I will ask you to enhance trans-
parency towards citizens and the European Parliament
during all steps of the negotiations [of TTIP]’ (Juncker,
2014, p. 4). Underlining the importance of transparency,
in its first weeks in office, the EC launched transparency
initiatives committing to publishing information onmeet-
ings of its Commissioners and senior officials and provid-
ing greater access to documents relating to TTIP (Core-
mans, 2017; European Commission, 2014). Making trade
policy more transparent was also one of the three pillars
of the current Commission’s trade policy strategy ‘Trade
for all’ (European Commission, 2015a).
Nevertheless, criticism with regard to the trans-
parency of the TTIP negotiations has not withered away.
According to trade union confederations of the EU and
the US ‘the transparency we have called for has not been
achieved’ (European Trade Union Confederation [ETUC],
2016). Corporate Europe Observatory [CEO] (2015) ar-
gued that ‘despite the public relations [TTIP is] still under
a cloak of secrecy’. Greenpeace (2016) released leaked
documents ‘to bring somemuch-needed transparency to
the debate on TTIP’, and even The Economist (2016) con-
cluded that ‘transparency concerns were ignored’.
In this article, we explain why the transparency initia-
tives of the EC in TTIP have not succeeded in muting crit-
icism of the negotiations, particularly those from CSOs.
To do so, we perform a detailed analysis of the positions
regarding transparency as expressed by CSOs, business,
and the EC. We go on to compare the positions and try
to explain the similarities and differences between them.
We complement this analysis with two targeted inter-
views. The remainder of this article is structured as fol-
lows: in section two, we briefly explain how transparency
questions came to penetrate the international trade sys-
tem. Section three empirically analyzes business’ and
CSOs’ transparency demands in TTIP, and the response
of the Commission. Section four explains the continuing
transparency conflict by tapping into the literature on le-
gitimate global governance, different models of account-
ability and the role of transparency and participation
in these. We conclude by discussing the implications of
our findings for the literature and the practice of (trans-
parency in) EU trade negotiations.
2. Why Transparency Became an Issue in the Trade
System
As the nature of the post-war international trade sys-
tem changed over time its legitimacy has increasingly
been questioned.
During the first decades of the post-war period, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), similarly
to other BrettonWoods international organizations (IOs),
were seen as facilitating coordination between states,
while still allowing for national policy space to preserve
domestic stability (Keohane & Nye, 2001; Zürn, 2004).
The fundamental rationale of this set-up lies in what
John Ruggie (1982) famously dubbed ‘embedded liber-
alism’: oriented towards liberal multilateralism, but with
national governments still in the driving seat as shock ab-
sorbers (cf. Rodrik, 1998). The mode of governance as-
sociated with this paradigm has been labeled ‘executive
multilateralism’: ‘governmental representatives from dif-
ferent countries coordinate their policies internation-
ally, but with little national parliamentary control and
away from public scrutiny’ (Zürn, 2004). IOs hence op-
erated as ‘clubs’ of negotiators who worked in techni-
cally advanced bargaining sessions with each other be-
hind closed doors (Hocking, 2004; Keohane&Nye, 2001).
In the trade regime specifically, the opaqueness of
the working methods of the GATT and the EU were per-
vasive (Florini, 2003; Woolcock, 2010). However, for sev-
eral decades this was seen as both effective, in reach-
ing the goal of progressively liberalizing trade, and un-
problematic, as the system had left sufficient space
for governments to pursue domestic policies. When by
the 1970s world tariffs became only a fraction of what
they had been in the first years of the post-war period,
other elements that hampered trade came into view, so-
called ‘non-tariff barriers’ such as cross-national differ-
ences in regulation (Winslett, 2016). Especially since the
Uruguay Round (1986–1994) and the transformation of
the GATT into the World Trade Organization (WTO), we
have witnessed an increase in the scope, depth and le-
gal bite of the international trade system (Araujo, 2016;
Horn, Mavroidis, & Sapir, 2009). Trade negotiations had
become more focused on ‘behind-the-border barriers’,
while the meaning of what constitutes a trade ‘barrier’
expanded beyond clearly discriminatory policies (Lang,
2011, pp. 226–227). In this way, domestic regulations
that reflect societal preferences in areas such as pub-
lic services or social, environmental or health protec-
tion made their way onto the trade agenda (Woods &
Narlikar, 2001; Young & Peterson, 2006; Zürn, 2004).
Awareness of this increased intrusion into sensi-
tive domestic policy issues gradually led to the involve-
ment of new actors in the international trade scene,
such as parliaments, trade unions, but above all non-
governmental organizations (Aaronson, 2002; Young &
Peterson, 2006). At the turn of themillennium, coalitions
of these actors were successful at (temporarily) blocking
new initiatives such as the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment in 1998 and the launch of a WTO trade ne-
gotiating round at Seattle in 1999 (Smith, 2001; Walter,
2001). NGOs in particular not only criticized the sup-
posedly ‘neoliberal’ substance (e.g. Gill, 1998), but also
the procedural characteristics of the trade system. They
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 16–28 17
argued that since trade negotiations now have amore di-
rect and significant impact on citizens’ daily life, the trade
system needs to be made more transparent and include
non-traditional players in the process (Goldman, 1994;
Hopewell, 2015). These demands were directed at the
multilateral as well as the EU level. Trade policy in the
EU in the past has been depicted—also by pundits—as
informal and dominated by a ‘relatively small expert pol-
icy community’ (Woolcock, 2010). Hence, a combination
of politicization of trade policy, together with the dele-
gation of trade authority to the supranational level, has
made for a ‘potentially explosive mix’ in the EU (Meu-
nier, 2003).
Both the WTO as well as the EU have over the years
responded to these criticisms by somewhat increasing
transparency and involvement of NGOs. Since the early
2000s, the WTO has made more documents public, es-
tablished an accessible website, accepted amicus curiae
briefs in dispute settlement proceedings and organized
annual public outreach events (cf. Smythe& Smith, 2006;
Woods & Narlikar, 2001). At the level of the EU, a specifi-
cally trade-related Civil Society Dialogue has been estab-
lished, but its significance for giving input to (and receiv-
ing feedback from) the trade policy-making process has
been assessed as being modest at best (Dür & De Bièvre,
2007; Hocking, 2004; Jarman, 2008). Despite (gradual)
changes on both levels, the issue of transparency again
became central to the TTIP debate.
3. Demand and Supply of Transparency in TTIP
Demands for increased transparency of trade negotia-
tions have been very intense during the TTIP negotia-
tions. It is not our aim to explain at length why this was
the case. In brief, it can be argued that TTIP, through its
enhanced focus on regulatory cooperation, would more
than ever be about affecting domestic policies and that
CSOs responded partly by reinforcing their demands for
transparency (see De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2016). Our
main goal is to analyze precisely what the demands of
CSOs were in terms of transparency and how the Euro-
pean Commission has responded. This should allow us
to explain in the next section why both continue to dis-
agree regarding the question of transparency.
Empirically, we focus on the investigation that the Eu-
ropeanOmbudsman undertook in the fall of 2014 to eval-
uate transparency in the TTIP talks, as a direct response
to the public outcry by CSOs. Contrary to the other con-
tributions in this issue that focused more on the institu-
tional side of the initiative (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017;
Neuhold & Năstase, 2017), we focus in particular on the
public consultation. During the period from July to Octo-
ber 2014, organizations and individuals were invited to
provide their input on three concrete questions related
to transparency: (i) concrete measures the EC could take
tomake the TTIP negotiations more transparent; (ii) best
practices identified in other organizations; (iii) how trans-
parency might affect the outcome of negotiations. In
total, 56 written contributions were provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs, 26), business organi-
zations (16), trade unions (7), public service providers (4),
and MEPs (3). Due to low numbers, we have excluded
the latter two categories, which implies a total of 49 ana-
lyzed contributions.2 All contributions are freely accessi-
ble on the Ombudsman’s website (OI/11/2014/RA). It is
worth stressing that these contributions were provided
before the new Commissioner took office (November
2014). By comparing these positions with the changes
implemented by the new Commission we can highlight
the similarities and differences between them.
We havemanually analyzed the content of these con-
tributions and systematically distilled the demandsmade
by different types of groups concerning the transparency
deficit. As we did not have any preconception of what
would be demanded, we approached this analysis induc-
tively and constructed categories along the way. In do-
ing so, we ended up with three distinctions. First, even
though the questions were formulated narrowly regard-
ing ‘transparency’, several organizations made claims
that relate more to the concept of ‘participation’: ‘the
presence of and activities by non-state actors within in-
stitutional mechanisms created by an organization’ (Tall-
berg, 2014). Second, claims were either general or spe-
cific. Third, specific transparency claims could be broken
down into demands for ‘negotiating’ documents (techni-
cal texts or inside information about the process) or ‘ex-
planatory’ documents to help understand the technical
texts or process. Table 1 below summarizes these distinc-
tions and gives examples of what was coded where.
Specific demands were coded cautiously, meaning
that whenever it was unclear how far the demand went
(e.g. ‘wewant to know the position of the EU’), we coded
this under the least demanding category (e.g. ‘position
paper’, which is an explanatory document outlining the
overall goal of the EU in a specific domain). Ambigu-
ous statements were discussed jointly amongst the au-
thors prior to coding. As will be shown later, we have
constructed a table concerning (the number of) specific
transparency demands. We have only included claims
thatwere voiced at least three times, to excludemarginal
demands. For participation, such a table is less instruc-
tive, given that demands were both more general, and—
when specific—more difficult to put under one heading.
These are illustrated by characteristic examples.
Because there is considerable variation within both
the business and CSO group, we have been careful not to
over-generalize our findings. Nonetheless, the extent of
coherence found within these groups was quite remark-
able. Business groups, NGOs, and trade unions have of-
ten copy-pasted parts of (or sometimes entire) position
2 We have also excluded 257 individual submissions (which were grouped together by the Ombudsman) for two reasons. First, we are interested in the
positions by (groups of) organizations, not by individuals. Second, many individual contributions were either copy-paste answers of NGO contributions
or lacked any meaningful substance (such as: ‘I don’t support TTIP’).
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Table 1. Coding classification with examples.
Transparency Participation
General
‘So far, attempts at more transparency
made by the European Commission
regarding access to documents are either
weak or deceiving’
‘the European Union should do more to
ensure a balanced participation in and
influence of interests on the negotiations’
Specific
‘Negotiating’ ‘The single most important transparency
reform around the TTIP negotiations
would be to make the negotiating text
public’
‘Public consultation before and after
every negotiating round’
‘Explanatory’ ‘An agenda prior to each round to allow
for comments by interested stakeholders’
papers of others, adding to this sense of coherence.3 For
NGOs, this is in line with the finding that transparency
has been the one thing different groups could agree
upon (see e.g. Gheyle, 2016). To be as clear as possible,
we have put the abbreviation of the organization(s) next
to quotes and claims.4
3.1. Demands for Transparency
3.1.1. Business Associations
Almost all business contributions laud and commend the
Commission for the work on transparency that has al-
ready been done (BE, ESF, TABC, FI, IBEC, DI, BDI).5 Am-
ChamEU argues that it is ‘hard to imagine what more
could be done to enhance transparency without under-
mining the ability of the EU and US officials to discuss
and negotiate’ while the Swedish Industry Confederation
warns that going further ‘risk[s] compromising the nego-
tiations’. The Commission is urged to demandmore trans-
parency from the negotiating partner (BE, CC, BDI, ESF)
and to encourage Member States to improve on trans-
parency (SWI, ESF) and to better explain the benefits of
trade negotiations (BE).
BusinessEurope argues that the role of transparency
is in part to ‘dispel myths and misperceptions of the TTIP
agreement allowing a fact-based public debate and to
making the deal more accessible and relatable to the
people’ (BE). There is a focus on ‘explaining’ what the ne-
gotiations are about and what the possible benefits and
risks are (ESF). With this in mind, they stress the legiti-
mate need to keep things confidential in order for nego-
tiations to succeed (BE, ESF, DI, BDI).
Business organizations do make several recommen-
dations on how the situation could be improved. In line
with the general idea of ‘explaining’ trade negotiations
more to the public, the bulk of these concern ‘explana-
tory’ documents and arrangements. All non-confidential
documents should be put in an online register (FI, DI, ESF,
SWI, VDA) and prior to each round an agenda should be
published to allow for comments (BE, BDI, VDA). More
attention should be given to the translation of tech-
nical texts into other languages (TABC) or to easy-to-
understand language explanations and summaries (FI,
BE, DI, SWI, VDA). Recommendations to improve access
to negotiating documents are scarce. The most common
demand is that there should be up-to-date digital access
to confidential documents for a restricted group of stake-
holders through accredited password systems instead of
the reading room practice (BE, ESF, DI, SWI).
In sum, the position of business on formal trans-
parency could be summarized as ‘make sure that what
is already public is better disseminated and explained
to the public’. This is in line with their general remark
that the Commission has already done a lot, and going
much further could harm the effectiveness or outcome
of negotiations.
3.1.2. Civil Society Organizations
CSOs are much more critical in terms of what has
been accomplished. Praise for the Commission is hardly
present, and the improvements to date have been de-
picted as ‘[coming] from a very low base, and most of
its actions have been neither meaningful nor sufficient’
(EDRI), ‘ad-hoc initiatives…and not part of a well-thought
out overall strategy’ (EPHA, TACD), ‘weak or deceiving’
(ACC), ‘omitting whatever the Commission deems con-
troversial’ (CEO) or ‘does not meet minimum satisfactory
level of transparency and engagementwith stakeholders’
(BEUC). With respect to transparency claims, therefore,
the recommendations are broad and very demanding. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes which demands have been put forward
by NGOs and trade unions.
3 While submissions have beenmade both by EU-level (22/49) and national organizations (27/49), we did not find strong variation between both. National
branches of trade unions and business organizations did seem to take a slightly stronger position. Neither did we see significant difference between
CSOs that have institutionalized access to TTIP negotiators, for example as part of the TTIP Advisory Group, and other, outside organizations. We thank
one of the anonymous referees for bringing this possibility to our attention.
4 The full list of abbreviations can be found in the annex.
5 An exception are agricultural business groups: while the umbrella organization Copa-Cogeca sideswith the other business groups, the sectoral European
Milk Board and Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association take positions similar to CSOs.
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Table 2. Specific transparency demands by CSO.
Demand # Asked by
Negotiating documents
Textual proposals 25
CEO, FOEE, TACD, TE, AI, FI, MPE, PC, BEUC, ACC, EDRI,
EPHA, FFII, BUND, CE, CWF, VB, WECF, FP, UM, ETUC,
ETUCE, TUC, GMB, UUI
List of meetings (and minutes) of EC officials with
third parties 20
CEO, FOEE, TACD, TE, AI, FW, FI, IGO, BEUC, ACC, EDRI,
EMI, EPHA, BUND, CE, CWF, VB, WECF, FO, GMB
Consolidated texts 18 CEO, FOEE, TACD, TE, AI, FI, BEUC, ACC, EDRI, EPHA,FFII, BUND, CE, VB, WECF, FP, UM, GMB
Correspondence / submissions by third parties 16 CEO, FOEE, TACD, TE, AI, FI, BEUC, ACC, EDRI, EMI,EPHA, BUND, CE, CWF, VB, WECF
Negotiating mandate 16 CEO, TACD, AI, PC, BEUC, ACC, EDRI, EPHA, FFII, BUND,CE, VB, FP, UM, GMB, UUI
Correspondence between EC and other institutional
bodies 12
FOEE, TE, AI, FI, BEUC, ACC, EDRI, BUND, CE, CWF, VB,
WECF
Drafts, non-papers 8 CEO, FOEE, TE, AI, FI, EDRI, WECF, GMB
Respond to ‘Access to documents’ requests in timely
fashion 6 CEO, AI, FW, EDRI, FFII, UUI
Legal opinions 4 FFII, ETUC, TUC, UUI
Explanatory documents
Meaningful briefings and state of play documents 20
CEO, FOEE, TACD, TE, AI, FI, MPE, PC, BEUC, EMI,
EPHA, BUND, CE, CWF, VB, WECF, FP, ETUC, ETUCE,
TUC
Position papers 16 FOEE, TACD, TE, AI, FI, BEUC, ACC, BUND, CE, CWF, VB,WECF, UM, ETUC, ETUCE, TUC
Agendas of (content of) negotiating rounds 15 CEO, FOEE, TACD, TE, AI, FI, MPE, PC, BEUC, ACC,EPHA, BUND, CE, VB, WECF
Make documents easily accessible in an online
register 11
CEO, TACD, FW, MPE, EDRI, EPHA, EMI, FFII, CE, ETUC,
TUC
Translate documents 5 MPE, PC, ETUC, ETUCE, TUC
List of which documents are available and who has
access to them 4 BEUC, EMI, EPHA, VB
The most important difference is that NGOs put
much more emphasis on negotiating than on merely ex-
planatory documents. In particular, NGOs ask for broad
access to official documents of the EU and the negoti-
ating partners: the mandate, textual proposals by the
EU and the consolidated version when the US tabled its
position. In addition, they ask for a list of meetings of
trade officials, and all correspondence by third parties
sent to them and vice versa. The kind of explanatory doc-
uments asked for are detailed agendas and meaningful
briefings relating to negotiating rounds. The added adjec-
tive ‘meaningful’ refers to—as EDRI put it—‘substantive
documents, not altered in anywaywhen released and no
‘mere summaries, agendas orminuteswith no specific in-
formation or ‘propaganda texts’’.
Trade unions take up a middle-ground position, even
though they tend towards the NGO position. They ar-
gue that as a general presumption, everything should
be public, but they leave room for exceptions if there
is a demonstrable need (such as strategic landing zones)
(ETUC, ETUCE, TUC). At least, position papers and (draft)
offers should be circulated (ETUC, ETUCE, TUC, GMB,
UUI). A newelement they demand is the publication of le-
gal documents containing the interpretation of draft ne-
gotiating texts or amendments (UUI, ETUC, TUC). When
it comes to explanatory measures, they mainly stress
the need for meaningful state of play and round reports
(ETUC, ETUCE, TUC). Although the national trade unions
which were analyzed (DM, VIZ, GMB, UUI) seem more
critical than the European umbrella ETUC, the latter still
demands several steps forward, and therefore we situ-
ate the aggregate trade union position as being close to
the average NGO position. This is strengthened by the
fact that three sectoral European trade union umbrellas
(EPSU, EFJ, ETF) have co-signed a critical letter regarding
transparency together with 250 NGOs (CEO, 2014).
In sum, while the focus of business groups with re-
gard to transparency was on ‘explaining’ trade negotia-
tions and texts to the public, CSOs differ in that theywant
access to the official documents of negotiations.
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3.2. Demands for Participation
As business organizations expressed their satisfaction
with the current state of transparency in trade negotia-
tions, they hardly called for other additional measures.
Their claims to increase participation and stakeholder
consultation are very scarce. Their sole demand in this
category concerns the TTIP Advisory Group, which is a
group of 16 civil society and business representatives
that was established early in 2014. Recommendations in
this respect are about expanding the group (BDI, VDA)
and about the inner-workings, such as giving the AG
more time to comment on more comprehensive brief-
ings on US positions (BE, DI, SI).
The scarcity of demands for increased participation
by business becomes clear when compared to the way
NGOs describe participation and its necessity as being
a complement to transparency for enhancing legitimacy.
First of all, several NGOs have mentioned how trans-
parency is only a stepping-stone towards greater partic-
ipation: ‘Transparency must be a sine qua non prerequi-
site of trade negotiations as it brings wide-ranging ben-
efits by enabling democratic participation and needed
scrutiny in the process’ (ACC); ‘by disclosing and proac-
tively publishing more information and documentation
to citizens and civil society groups, the EU could more
effectively open participatory mechanisms and foster
healthy public debate’ (AI); “openness enables citizens to
participate more closely in the decision-making process’
(ClientEarth).
Secondly, the difference between the demands of
business and NGOs is demonstrated by how NGOs per-
ceive transparency and participatory measures as being
linked. ACCESS identifies six areas that need to be ad-
dressed together: access to documents, advisory groups,
stakeholder dialogues, involvement of parliaments, read-
ing rooms and identifying ‘revolving doors’. The same
goes for BEUC and TACD, who listed a whole range of
claims both on transparency and participation and state
that ‘the proposals listed below need to be implemented
and assessed in combination because they complement
each other and only together they would lead as an end-
result to a more credible trade deal’. TACD summarizes
this point well: ‘Why ‘transparency’? Meaningful input
by those directly affected by the negotiations will result
in more balanced provisions of the agreement’.
Thirdly, existing participatorymechanisms have been
a concern on their own. The ‘Civil Society Dialogues’ are
still perceived more as briefings from the Commission,
where a few questions are briefly raised at the end with
only vague answers in response (EDRI, ACC, FP): ‘these
meetings do not enable the promised ‘dialogue’ to take
place’ (ACC). Public consultations offer ‘a fig leaf of cred-
ibility to the policies adopted, they are in fact totally in-
adequate for gauging the needs or wishes of the citizens
affected’ (FW). Lastly, BEUC, as amember of the Advisory
Group questioned ‘to which extent the AG risks being a
tool to white wash non-transparent processes’ (BEUC).
Fourthly, when asked for best practices of trans-
parency in other institutions, several examples came
back repeatedly, which describe a very far-reaching
view on the transparency-participation link. Both the
WIPO negotiation process (see McIntosh, 2014), and the
Aarhus convention are popular examples and are consid-
ered a hallmark of transparency and participation. Fea-
tures of these include timely document releases, open
meetings, and participatory rights in meetings and even
drafting groups. By referring to these far-reaching best
practices, NGOs again propose a differentmodel of trans-
parency and participation than what is currently in place.
Finally, there are also specific demands with respect
to participation. To some extent, these are ‘remedies’ to
the observed deficiencies with current channels outlined
above. Most elaborate are the demands to improve the
work of the Advisory Group. Texts being developed for fu-
ture rounds (andmerged legal texts) should be presented
on a secure online platform, in a timely fashion to allow
AG members to make sensible contributions on which
the Commission should respond meaningfully (ACC, EMI,
BEUC, EPHA, EDRI). The selection process should bemade
more transparent (ACC, EDRI) and the group should be
expanded to include more stakeholders (EDRI, FFII). The
group should also be included in the negotiations more
fully (EMI). Secondly, the stakeholder dialogues should
resemble a true ‘dialogue’ between stakeholders and the
Commission (ACC, FP, EDRI). The criteria to be involved in
the CSDmust be clearly spelt out (EDRI) and themeetings
would be more meaningful if sector-specific roundtables
were established to provide direct input, in which stake-
holders have access to technical documents, and this par-
ticipation has the potential to shape the strategy and po-
sitioning of the negotiations (ACC, FP).
Besides the meaningful upgrading of existing chan-
nels, public consultation at various stages of the nego-
tiations is a popular, but heterogeneous, demand. For
some, consultations should take place before and after
every negotiating round (BUND), where a technical work-
shop is organized to engage in dialogue about certain
parts of the text (MPE; PC). For others, consultations
should be held on each aspect of trade that touches on
EU and national rule-making (such as ISDS or regulatory
cooperation) (FOEE, TE, WECF, AI, FP, CWF). A final sug-
gestion is to hold consultations at key stages of the ne-
gotiations: prior to the launch, on the draft mandate, on
initial position papers, and on the final draft consolidated
legal text (TACD, BEUC, EPHA). Whatever the exact tim-
ing or constellation, all contributions ask for the results
of these public consultations to be fully reflected in the
positions that negotiators take.
Trade unions also plead for more and better partici-
patory options (UUI, ETUC, GMB) and for amore genuine
dialogue (ETUCE). They specifically demand that for sec-
toral aspects, DG TRADE would hold discussions in the
existing sectoral social dialogue committees and create
new ones when non-existent (ETUC, TUC). They support
the Advisory Group in principle but think that having only
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two trade union representatives is insufficient and that it
should be more involved in position formulation rather
than simply reacting to positions that have already been
made (GMB, TUC, ETUC). In general, again they seem to
tend towards the NGO position, albeit withmore empha-
sis on their own lack of participation (for those not in-
cluded in the AG).
3.3. The European Commission’s Response
Notwithstanding that the questions in her public consul-
tation referred to rather more formal aspects of trans-
parency (cf. supra), in her decision closing the inquiry,
the Ombudsman concluded that the ‘public consultation
confirm[s] that citizens expect and demand the right to
know and to participate when it comes to TTIP’ (Euro-
pean Ombudsman, 2015, emphasis added). Her sugges-
tions were included under three headings, two referring
to transparency and one to participation, respectively:
‘greater public access to negotiating documents’, ‘more
proactive disclosure of documents’ and ‘more balanced
and transparent public participation’. With regard to the
latter, the Ombudsman’s recommendations come down
to ensuring that the Commission’s contacts with CSOs
make for a balanced representation and are ‘transparent
about participation’, i.e. publishing details and substan-
tial summaries of its contacts, including those at lower
levels of the organization.
In its official response to this decision, ‘the Commis-
sion appreciates the European Ombudsman’s call for a
more proactive approach to transparency and welcomes
the suggestions made’ (European Commission, 2015b,
p. 1). It emphasized that on 7 January 2015, the Com-
mission published, for the first time ever, eight EU tex-
tual proposals and a number of new position papers, ac-
companied by explanatory leaflets to make them more
accessible to a wider audience. With regard to the Om-
budsman’s suggestion to ask the US to also publish ‘com-
mon negotiating texts’ and to justify explicitly if and
when such requests are refused, the Commission stated
that ‘in the context of an international negotiation, the
Commission’s political commitment to transparency is
limited to its own documents’ (European Commission,
2015b), and that it has discussed transparency with the
US repeatedly, but that the latter has explicitly asked
the Commission not to publish US documents or con-
solidated texts. Consolidated documents have, however,
been made available to all MEPs as well as Member
State national parliamentarians. The Commission also re-
sponded negatively to the suggestion of the Ombuds-
man to publish proactively all relevant internal docu-
ments pertaining to the TTIP negotiations except in cases
of justifiable exception as this would ‘represent a dis-
proportionate burden on the Commission services’ (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2015b, p. 3). With regard to public
participation, the Commission reiterated its already im-
plemented actions in terms of a ‘TTIP Advisory Group,
public consultations and stakeholder involvement’ (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015b, pp. 4–8).
By analyzing the transparency changes since Com-
missioner Malmström took office, and following the Om-
budsman’s recommendations, we see a combination of
reinforcing existing measures (such as the TTIP AG, stake-
holders meetings during negotiating rounds and the pub-
lication of explanatory documents), with new steps (such
as the publication of textual proposals). In this way, the
EC has been able to address several of the specific de-
mands raised by CSOs, albeit in a limited interpretation
(see also CEO, 2015). Textual proposals have been pub-
lished but in a piecemeal manner.6 Lists of meetings
with policy officials have been made public, but are con-
fined to the highest policy ranks, and without reports
of what was discussed. Third party correspondence has
beenmadepublic, but onlywith respect to Commissioner
Malmström (and not, as several organizations demand,
regarding the main negotiators as well). Besides these
partial gaps, what is missing, according to a policy officer
of BEUC, are the consolidated texts (which necessitates
agreementwith theUS), and—above all—the application
of these transparency changes towards other negotia-
tions, especially concerning the mandate (interview 1).7
This maximalist across-the-board application of
transparency is not shared by the EC, because they
stress a balance between transparency and responsibil-
ity: there is a legitimate need to keep things confidential
at several points in the process (interview 2).8 They have
put most focus on increasing transparency towards the
co-legislators, in order to enhance inter-interinstitutional
relations.With respect to explanatory documents, the EC
has acted in a very strong way, and there are numerous
reader-friendly documents, agendas and round reports
available. This is in line with the view that ‘the best way
to calm down people’s concerns and fears, and to also
stop and rebut myths, is to say what is really going on’
(interview 2). In the same vein, the outreach of the Com-
missioner, her cabinet Members and senior DG Trade
officials have been reinforced. As is widely recognized,
Commissioner Malmström seems to have given the ex-
isting mechanisms greater priority and has adopted a
more open ‘style’ towards CSOs.
With respect to participation, however, we do not
seemuch convergence. The EC has considerably stepped
up its interaction with the European Parliament and has
reached out to other institutional partners, especially na-
tional parliaments. In relation to civil society, however,
it merely reaffirmed its commitment to the AG, and to
existing stakeholder mechanisms, such as the Civil Soci-
ety Dialogue and debriefing ‘breaks’ during negotiation
rounds. These installments were already in place and
were part of the criticism of many of the CSO contribu-
6 Several proposals, such as on procurement, ICT or pesticides are at the time of writing (June 2017) missing, however.
7 Policy officer, BEUC.
8 Policy assistant, European Commission.
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tions. Both the quality of these mechanisms and the ab-
sence of newways inwhich civil society is involved in two-
way deliberation of the negotiations are still missing, in
the eyes of the critics.
4. Explaining the Continuous Conflict
Our analysis of the contributions of different groups on
the issue of transparency in the TTIP negotiations shows
that there are two sides: business organizations and the
EC on one hand, and CSOs on the other. The difference
in position between them is both a question of degree,
and of kind. The continuous conflict is partly due to the
fact that CSOs ask for a level of transparency that the
Commission has not fully delivered, as the EC appar-
ently does not share a maximalist interpretation of trans-
parency. Furthermore, CSOs view transparency as inex-
tricably linked to (allowing for their) participation, while
for the EC participation applies predominantly to institu-
tional partners.9 In sum, for the EC, transparency is pri-
marily aimed at fostering citizens’ trust by allowing them
to understand what is being negotiated. For CSOs, trans-
parency is just a stepping-stone that should allow citizens
(through CSOs) to meaningfully participate in the negoti-
ations, and only this can bring trust.
These different visions can be theoretically captured
by the literature on accountability in IOs, which differen-
tiates between a ‘delegation model’ and a ‘participation
model’. In an influential article, Grant & Keohane (2005)
tackle the pervasive issue of the (un)accountability of IOs
such as the WTO. The main question of accountability,
they argue, is ‘who are the actors that have the right to
hold someone to account?’ (p. 31). One way of looking at
this involves relying on formal strings of delegation—the
so-called ‘delegation model’ of accountability. Organiza-
tions are accountable to those who have entrusted them
power (e.g. states), and hence power is legitimate ‘when
it is authorized by the legitimizing consent of those who
delegate it’ (Grant & Keohane, 2005). In this sense, there
is no requirement for intense participation by non-state
actors, given that they have not provided the mandate di-
rectly. Accountability here is primarily seen as vertical and
concernedwith compliancewith rules and standards that
have been laid down by a principal (Hood, 2010, p. 998).
Certainly, there will need to be some transparency along
these lines, but primarily towards these principals. Given
that—along this reasoning—transparency can go ‘too far’,
it is unlikely that claims for a maximalist interpretation
will follow. Rather, transparency will be seen as an instru-
mental value (Heald, 2006) that in some situations can
improve accountability.
A second model of accountability stresses that the
people who are governed by an institution should be
able to influence its direction (Grant & Keohane, 2005;
Nanz & Steffek, 2004). If the rules of an international or-
ganization or agreement impact people’s daily lives, then
they should be able to have a say in the decision-making
process. CSOs (who claim to represent the wider public)
in this respect make normative claims for holding power-
wielders to account to those groups that bear the burden
of their policies (Keohane, 2005). Accountability in this
sense is labeled the ‘participation model’10 and directed
towards the people or the community at large. The ideal
is a fully transparent society, hence the presumption to-
wards general openness and disclosure, rather than one
involving strong rules about who should be allowed ac-
cess to information (Hood, 2010, p. 1000).Maximal trans-
parency should, in this view, allow meaningful participa-
tion of representative CSOs. Rather than having an instru-
mental value, transparency here is seen more as being a
human right in itself (Birkinshaw, 2006).
Based on our analysis, the EC and business organiza-
tions clearly tend towards a delegationmodel of account-
ability, while CSOs’ vision of transparency relates to a par-
ticipation model of accountability. The EC negotiates in-
ternational trade agreements based on a mandate given
by the Council of the EU and has to report regularly to the
European Parliament. There are thus two chains of ac-
countability that link European citizens to the EU’s trade
negotiations and the Commission is of the opinion that it
is primarily accountable to the two co-legislators that del-
egated it the authority to negotiate (interview 2). Hence,
the EC feels that its responsibility to be transparent and
to allow participation is first and foremost towards the
Member States and the European Parliament. Some de-
gree of transparency directly to the public should allow
for meaningful understanding by citizens, to build trust
and allow them to exercise control through national and
European elections. In this vision, it makes sense that in
its transparency initiatives, the EC has gonemuch further
in giving access to documents to European and national
parliamentarians (including access to consolidated texts)
and in interacting with them, than to CSOs.
CSOs, in their participation model of accountability,
see a crucial role for them to represent citizens in the
opaque and closed world of international trade negotia-
tions. They perceive the increased transparency towards
and involvement of national and European parliamen-
tarians as insufficient as the chains of delegation in EU
trade negotiations are too long and the transparency ini-
tiatives still prevent European and national parliamen-
tarians from fully engaging with citizens (for example
through strict confidentiality requirements). Hence, they
see themselves as crucial to fill the gap between inter-
national and European trade governance and the cit-
izens.11 To ensure accountable and hence legitimate
9 Business organizations’ lack of criticism on participation is obviously linked to their already well-established (informal) position in trade negotiations.
10 This view is therefore closely connected to direct rather than representative forms of democracy.
11 As suggested by one of the anonymous referees, CSOs could also participate in trade negotiations through the national level. While transparency
and participation in trade negotiations within the Member States is outside of the scope of this article, the fact that CSOs insist so much on increasing
transparency and participation at the EU level, and have not mentioned a single Member State in the Ombudsman’s question about best practices,
might show that they do not fully believe in this national route.
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trade negotiations, they demand access to all informa-
tion about these negotiations and should be able to en-
gage in meaningful dialogue with the institutions con-
ducting the negotiations.
An alternative explanation for the continuous trans-
parency complaints of CSOs is of course that their real
frustration concerns the substance of TTIP with which
they disagree as well as their lack of influence upon it.
Transparency could be a handy ‘rally point’ with which it
is difficult to disagree and which brings together diverse
organizations with different substantial preferences in a
joint coalition. Such ‘tactical usage’ of transparency is al-
ways possible, and impossible to falsify empirically be-
cause of observational equivalence with our interpreta-
tion above. But we believe this does not undermine our
argument. CSOs have held a consistent position on trans-
parency throughout the TTIP negotiations (and even
since the contestation of globalization at the end of the
1990s),which—aswehave shown—has not been fully ac-
commodated. Moreover, the Ombudsman consultation
central to our analysis came rather early on in the pro-
cess, when it was not clear that CSOs would be unable
to impact on the substance of the negotiations, so there
should have been less reason to use the ‘transparency
argument’ as a surrogate at that point.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical puzzle at the outset of this article con-
cerned the question why CSOs still criticize the ‘secrecy’
of the TTIP negotiations after the Commission has initi-
ated several transparency initiatives. To solve this ques-
tion, we analyzed the contributions of CSOs and busi-
ness organizations to a consultation by the EuropeanOm-
budsman on transparency in TTIP and contrasted this
with the position and actions of the EC. We found a
clear difference between business organizations, who ex-
pressed their satisfaction with the transparency initia-
tives, and CSOs, who asked both for greater transparency
that would go beyond ‘explanatory’ texts and above all
complemented by more opportunities for equal as well
as for more meaningful participation. Since then, the EC
and its Commissioner for Trade have implemented the
transparency mechanisms with more dedication, even
though they disagree with a maximalist interpretation in
which everything should be public as a rule. Moreover,
few new initiatives to increase the participation of CSOs
in the talks have been taken, even though CSOs clearly
stress the importance hereof.
From the Commission’s point of view, full trans-
parency for and participation of CSOs is not seen as the
most important aspect in a delegation model of account-
ability, in fact, it is even seen as potentially counterpro-
ductive. There is a legitimate need to keep things confi-
dential while keeping the principals (co-legislators) as en-
gaged as possible. CSOs, on the contrary, feel that their
(and citizens’) core interests are directly affected by TTIP,
and therefore demand to not only have insight into all
negotiating documents but also to be able to participate
meaningfully. The two are seen as being two sides of the
same coin (interview 1). Given these different views, it
is not surprising that the reform efforts seem to have
fallen on deaf ears with the broader civil society. While a
shortcoming of our research has been the difficulty to
rule out that CSOs use the ‘transparency claim’ strate-
gically, the fact that their claims have been consistent
and not fully accommodated reinforces the plausibility
of our argument.
This article has both academic and societal rele-
vance. Academically, we have linked debates about trans-
parency to the insights of the literature on the legiti-
macy of IOs through the analysis of a specific politicized
trade negotiation. By focusing on the gap between the
demands of CSOs and the supply by the EC in TTIP, we
showed that the enduring conflict on transparency can
be explained by fundamentally different views on the
requirements for legitimate trade negotiations. For the
trade policy literature, this article underlines the signifi-
cance of taking into account procedural preferences, be-
sides substantial interests, to understand the dynamics
of trade negotiations and positions taken by different
societal groups. The societal relevance of this article is
that it helps understand (part of) the conflict between
the EC and CSOs regarding trade negotiations. As this
conflict is rooted in different visions of legitimacy that
have become more important as trade agreements be-
came more intrusive into domestic politics, it is not ex-
pected to wither away easily (see also Zürn, 2014). In
fact, the same transparency criticism has recently been
voiced with respect to EU trade negotiations with Japan
and Mexico, adding to the demand that initiatives be ap-
plied beyond TTIP.
There have recently been some analyses regarding
the potential overlap between different approaches to
transparency (which come with different transparency
requirements) which relate to the dichotomy we identi-
fied in our case (see e.g. Abazi & Tauschinsky, 2015 on
trust and control approaches). It is, however, an open
question if a quest for a middle-ground between such
perspectives is feasible. In an era where attitudes to-
wards elites and public authorities quickly turn to sus-
picion when the slightest hint of secrecy is politicized,
less than full transparency might always be seen as prob-
lematic. The same goes for the apparent participation
problem between the EC and CSOs. While the kind of ex-
tensive participation demanded by the latter might be
overburdening for the former when taken to its extreme,
relying solely on a small Advisory Group of representa-
tives also bears the risk of (being perceived as) ‘coopt-
ing’ a selection of voices in order to legitimize the case
for free trade, similar to what happened after the Seat-
tle protests (Hocking, 2004; Hopewell, 2015). As shown,
CSOs are not against this AG-system per se but consider
it to be insufficient to incorporate a meaningful array
of voices. It seems that to make the future EU trade
governance more legitimate in the eyes of civil society,
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any elaboration of this future framework should also be
made in a transparent and inclusive way.
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Annex
List of organizations with abbreviations
Type Full name Abbrevation Level
NGO Corporate Europe Observatory CEO Europe
NGO Friends of the Earth Europe FOEE Europe
NGO Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue TACD Transatlantic
NGO Transport & Environment TE Europe
NGO Access Info AI Europe
NGO Food & Water Europe FW Europe
NGO Forum Informationsfreiheit FI Austria
NGO Instytut Globalnej Odpowiedzialnosci Polska IGO Poland
NGO L’Assocation Environnement et Développement Alternatif EDA France
NGO Maison du Peuple d’Europe — Huis van het Volk van Europa MPE Europe
NGO Pacte Civique PC France
NGO European Consumer Organization BEUC Europe
NGO Access ACC International
NGO European Digital Rights Initiative EDRi Europe
NGO European Movement International EMI Europe
NGO European Public Health Alliance EPHA Europe
NGO Alpe Adria Green AAG Slovenia
NGO Foliovision FO Slovakia (EU focus)
NGO Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure FFII Europe
NGO Friends of the Earth Germany BUND Germany
NGO Umweltinstitut München UM Germany
NGO Client Earth CE Europe
NGO Fundacja Panoptykon FP Poland
NGO Compassion in World Farming CWF UK
NGO Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. VB Germany
NGO Women in Europe for a Common Future WECF Europe
Business Copa-Cogeca CC Europe
Business European Services Forum ESF Europe
Business Business Europe BE Europe
Business Transatlantic Business Council TABC Transatlantic
Business ELINKEINOELÄMÄN KESKUSLIITTO (Finnish Industries) FI Finland
Business Standing Committee of European Doctors CPME Europe
Business Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie BDI Germany
Business Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association ICMSA Ireland
Business European Milk Board EMB Europe
Business American Chamber of Commerce to the EU AmCham Europe
Business Verband der Automobilindustrie VDA Germany
Business Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales SI Spain
[Spanish Industry]
Business Confederation of Danish Industry DI Denmark
Business Handwerkskammer für München und Oberbayern HMO Germany
Business Confederation of Swedish Enterprise SWI Sweden
Business Irish Business and Employers Confederation IBEC Ireland
Trade Union Dansk Magisterforening DM Denmark
Trade Union Sindikat Vzgoje, Izobraževanja, Znanosti in Kulture Slovenije VIZ Slovenia
Trade Union European Trade Union Committee for Education ETUCE Europe
Trade Union European Trade Union Confederation ETUC Europe
Trade Union Trades Union Congress TUC UK
Trade Union Unite the Union Ireland Region UUI Ireland
Trade Union GMB Trade Union GMB UK
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